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Abstract
In this paper we introduce a cooperative game based on the minimum cut tree
problem which is also known as multi-terminal maximum flow problem. Minimum
cut tree games are shown to be totally balanced and a solution in their core can
be obtained in polynomial time. This special core allocation is closely related to
the solution of the original graph theoretical problem. We give an example showing
that the game is not supermodular in general, however, it is for special cases and for
some of those we give an explicit formula for the calculation of the Shapley value.
Keywords: cooperative game, minimum cut tree, core, Shapley value, cactus graph
1 Introduction
Cooperative games on graphs combine the theories of graphs, optimization, and games.
One classic problem in graph theory is to ﬁnd a maximum ﬂow. In combinatorial op-
timization there is one central decision maker who controls all resources and aims to
optimize her objective. For the maximum ﬂow problem several eﬃcient algorithms are
known to solve it to optimality. The situation changes if the system is not controlled
by one individual but by several decision makers, the so called players who may have
conﬂicting objectives. A solution which is optimal for one decision maker or for the sys-
tem as a whole may not be accepted by the others and thus may not be implementable.
Therefore it is desirable to ﬁnd solutions which are attractive for at least those players
needed to realize them. The maximum ﬂow problem has been investigated intensively
from this game-theoretic perspective: in maximum ﬂow games the edges are controlled
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by players who want a reward for providing the capacity of their edges to the transport
of a good. Kalai and Zemel [KZ82] deﬁned the maximum ﬂow game and showed that
the solution of the corresponding graph theoretical problem yields a core solution of their
game, i.e., an allocation of rewards such that every player has an incentive to cooperate.
Surveys on the maximum ﬂow game and other cooperative games on graphs are given by
Curiel [Cur97] and Borm et al [BHH01].
In this paper we introduce and investigate a game based on the minimum cut tree problem.
We start by summarizing the necessary concepts in cooperative game theory and graph
theory and deﬁne the minimum cut tree game in Section 2. Some properties of the game
are discussed in Subsection 3.1 and a variant of the game is deﬁned in Subsection 3.2,
we state and prove a core allocation in Subsection 3.3. Finally, explicit formulas for the
Shapley value of special cases are given in Subsection 3.4.
2 Preliminaries And Notation
2.1 Cooperative Game Theory
A cooperative game with transferable utility consists of a set of players N and a char-
acteristic function v : 2N → R mapping every subset of players (a so called coalition)
to a real value. The game is superadditive if v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for all coalitions
S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅. Superadditive reward games incite disjoint coalitions to join.
In a supermodular game v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) holds for all coalitions.
A payoﬀ vector is a vector in RN assigning a value xi to every player i. An imputation is
a payoﬀ vector which is feasible and eﬃcient –
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) – as well as individually
rational – xi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N . The central question of a cooperative reward game
is: Once a coalition has been formed, how do we allocate the rewards such that every
member of the coalition is satisﬁed? There are several answers to this question based
on diﬀerent philosophies. The core C(v) of a game consists of all imputations satisfying
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all coalitions S ⊆ N , i.e., every coalition is better oﬀ joining the grand
coalition N and the reward of the grand coalition is completely distributed among the
players. The core of a game may be empty, a singleton or a convex polyhedron. A game
with non-empty core is balanced and vice versa. If all its subgames are balanced the game
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is totally balanced. Another important concept is the Shapley value [Sha53], which is the
average over all marginal vectors corresponding to all permutations of players. Let π be a
permutation of N and P (π, i) the predecessors of i w.r.t. π, then a marginal vector mπ(v)
is deﬁned by its entries mπi (v) := v(P (π, i) ∪ {i}) − v(P (π, i)). Thus, the Shapley value
can be calculated as φ(v) := 1
n!
∑
π∈ΠN m
π(v). The Shapley value of a general game may
not lie in the core, however, in supermodular game it is an element of the core. Therefore,
the core of a supermodular game is non-empty. In general, the calculation of the Shapley
value is #P-complete and the decision whether the core of a game is non-empty is in NP
due to results of Deng and Papadimitriou [DP94].
2.2 Minimum Cut Tree Problem
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph and w : E → R+ a weight function on its edges.
In order to calculate the maximum ﬂow or minimum cut between any pair of vertices one
could solve n(n−1)
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single source - single sink problems. Gomory and Hu [GH61] came up
with a smarter algorithm solving the problem in O(n4). Their procedure yields a minimum
cut tree T of G such that every edge e of T induces a cut te in G and the weight of e is
equal to the sum of the weights of edges of the original graph G in the cut, denoted by
wte . Given any pair of vertices u, v ∈ V , the minimum cut in G separating them equals
the minimum cut in T in terms of capacity and vertex partition. An edge of T is not
necessarily an edge of G. In the remainder of this paper, if we minimize an objective
function over the set of trees in a graph, these trees may also contain edges which are not
edges of the original graph. The problem can be described by minT : tree in G
∑
e∈T wte or
alternatively by minT : tree in G
∑
e∈T we · lTe where lTe is the number of edges on the path
in T connecting the endvertices of e. The complexity of the Gomory-Hu algorithm can
be improved to O(nτ) using a better maximum ﬂow algorithm with complexity O(τ), e.g.
the algorithm of Goldberg and Rao [GR98] with O(min(n
2
3 ,m
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2 )m log(n
2
m
) logU) where U
is the largest weight and all weights are integral. In the following we review the minimum
cut tree algorithm of Gomory and Hu:
Algorithm 2.1. Algorithm of Gomory and Hu
Input: undirected graph G = (V,E), weight function w : E → R+
Output: minimum cut tree T
1. Initialize V (T ) := {V (G)}, E(T ) := ∅
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2. Choose X ∈ V (T ) with |X| ≥ 2, if none exists go to 6.
3. Choose u, v ∈ X with u = v
Execute for all connected components C of T \X:
Let SC :=
⋃
Y ∈V (C) Y
Let (G′, w′) arise from (G,w) by contracting SC to a single vertex vC
(So V (G′) = X ∪ {vC : C is a connected component of T \X})
4. Find a minimum u− v-cut (U ′, V (G′) \ U ′) in (G′, w′)
Let W ′ := V (G′) \ U ′
Set U := (
⋃
vc∈U ′\X SC) ∪ (U ′ ∩X) and W := (
⋃
vc∈W ′\X SC) ∪ (W ′ ∩X)
5. Set V (T ) := (V (T ) \ {X}) ∪ {U ∩X,W ∩X}
For each edge e = {X,Y } ∈ E(T ) incident to vertex X do:
If Y ⊆ U then set e′ := {U ∩X,Y } else set e′ := {W ∩X,Y }
Set E(T ) := (E(T ) \ {e}) ∩ {e′} and w(e′) := w(e)
Set E(T ) := E(T ) ∪ {{U ∩X,W ∩X}} and w({U ∩X,W ∩X}) := w′(U ′,W ′)
Go to 2.
6. Replace all {x} ∈ V (T ) by x and all {{x}, {y}} ∈ E(T ) by {x, y}
STOP
An example for the minimum cut tree of a graph is shown in Figure 1 in Subsection 3.1.
2.3 Definition Of The Minimum Cut Tree Game
Let G = (N ∪r, E) be an undirected graph with edge set E and vertex set {i1, . . . , in}∪r.
The speciﬁed vertex r is the root vertex. The other vertices are owned by and will be
identiﬁed with players. We denote Nr := N ∪ r. Let w : Nr ×Nr → R+ ∪{0} be a weight
function mapping pairs of vertices to non-negative numbers. Let S ⊆ N be a coalition,
then Sr := S ∪ r and GSr is the subgraph of G induced by Sr.
The characteristic function of a cooperative minimum cut tree game is deﬁned as follows:
v(S) = min
T : tree inGSr
∑
i<j∈Sr
wij · lTij .
Here, i < j ∈ Sr implies that each vertex pair is only considered once.
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3 Minimum Cut Tree Game
3.1 Examples And Properties
Two examples will be used to visualize some of the considerations in this section. Let
G be the unweighted complete graph with n vertices plus root. We refer to the game it
implies as unitgame. The minimum cut tree for a coalition S ⊆ N is always a star tree,
no matter which vertex is the center, lij = 1 if either i or j is the center and lij = 2 else.
As a tree for |S| players has |S| + 1 vertices, |S| tree edges and (|S|+1)×|S|
2
− |S| non-tree
edges, we get v(S) = |S|+ 2 · ( (|S|+1)×|S|
2
− |S|) = |S|2.
The game referred to as second game is deﬁned by the graph in Figure 1. On the right
hand side the minimum cut tree is given for S = N . The values of the coalitions are given
in Table 1.
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Figure 1: Example of a game with four players
S v(S) S v(S) S v(S) S v(S) S v(S)
1 4 4 0 1,4 7 3,4 7 1,3,4 18
2 4 1,2 8 2,3 6 1,2,3 10 2,3,4 17
3 2 1,3 6 2,4 6 1,2,4 17 1,2,3,4 27
Table 1: Values of the coalitions
We give a construction scheme to obtain restricted trees which will be used in several
proofs later on.
Construction 3.1. Given a graph G = (N,E), a minimum cut tree T Nr and a coalition
S ⊆ N , we construct a tree T|Sr by restricting T Nr to S. First, T|Sr is initialized with all
vertices of Sr and no edges. Now, for every vertex i ∈ S we look at the path from i to
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r in T Nr , denominated by P T Nrir . Let wi be the weight of the ﬁrst edge on P T Nrir starting
from i and let j be the ﬁrst vertex of Sr on this path. Observe that j may be equal to r.
Connect i and j in T|Sr by an edge with weight wi.
Lemma 3.2. The weight of the restricted tree T|Sr obtained by Construction 3.1 is not
smaller than the weight of a minimum cut tree in GSr , i.e.,
∑
e∈T|Sr
we ≥ minT Sr∈GSr
∑
e∈T Sr
wG
Sr
te .
Proof. First, we have to show that we in T|Sr is not smaller than wGSrte , the weight of the
cut induced by e in GSr . Let i and j be the endvertices of e with i being further away
from r. Let Ui := {k ∈ N : i ∈ P T Nrkr }, Ui contains all vertices who are connected to r via
i, by deﬁnition it also contains i. The cut (Ui, Nr \ Ui) has weight we, however, the cut
deﬁned by (i, j) in GSr contains only a subset of this edges, namely (Ui∩S, (Nr \Ui)∩Sr).
Therefore, we ≥ wGSrte and we get
∑
e∈T|Sr
we ≥
∑
e∈T|Sr
wG
Sr
te ≥ minT Sr∈GSr
∑
e∈T Sr
wG
Sr
te
observing that a tree with the same edges as T|Sr may not be the minimum cut tree for
GSr .
Theorem 3.3. The minimum cut tree game is superadditive.
Proof. Let T S∪T∪r be a minimum cut tree of the union S ∪T , we construct trees T|Sr and
T|Tr restricted to vertices in Sr and Tr as in Construction 3.1, in this case N = S ∪ T .
Doing this, the weight of each edge of T S∪T∪r is assigned to exactly one of the restricted
trees depending on its endvertex which is further away from r. Now,
v(S) + v(T ) ≤
∑
e∈T|Sr
we +
∑
e∈T|Tr
we = minT S∪T∪r: tree inGS∪T∪r
∑
e∈T S∪T∪r
wG
S∪T∪r
te = v(S ∪ T ).
The ﬁrst inequality follows from Lemma 3.2.
However, a superadditive game cannot be transformed to a minimum cut tree game in
general, i.e., there may be no graph G implying a minimum cut tree game with the same
characteristic function. Let a three-player game be deﬁned by w(S) = 1 for |S| = 1,
w(S) = 4 for |S| = 2 and w(S) = 10 for |S| = 3. It diﬀers from the unitgame only by
the value of the grand coalition and it is superadditive. A graph implying a minimum
6
cut tree game with the same values has to have weight 1 for every edge adjacent to the
root, as v(S) = wir for S = {i}. Furthermore, for any other edge (i, j) with i, j = r we
get v({i, j}) = 2 + wij + min{1, wij} and this is not equal to 4 for wij = 1. Therefore,
the only graph which yields the required values for coalitions with less than 3 players is
the complete unweighted graph with four vertices. But, as we know from the unitgame
v(N) = |N |2 = 9 = 10 = w(N).
Theorem 3.4. Minimum cut tree games with at most three players are supermodular.
Proof. If |N | = 3 coalitions are either disjoint or one contains the other or they have one
player in common. Supermodularity follows from superadditivity for the ﬁrst two cases.
Let S∩T = {i}. We use the restriction from Construction 3.1 with a modiﬁcation. When
we consider vertex i as an S-vertex, we assign it to the next vertex of S on the path from
i to r in the minimum cut tree for the grand coalition. Its weight is not (Ui, Nr \ Ui)
but (Ui ∩ S, (Nr \ Ui) ∩ Sr) and still the argumentation of Lemma 3.2 holds. For T|Tr we
restrict analogously. The only edge in (Ui, Nr \Ui) whose weight we assign twice is (i, r).
As v({i}) = wir, we have v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
Supermodularity for games with more than three players is not given in general as can
be seen in Table 1, in this game coalitions S = {1, 2, 4} and T = {2, 3, 4} violate the
condition for supermodularity, as v(S) + v(T ) = 17+ 17 > 6+ 27 = v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ).
3.2 Edge Player Variant
An edge player variant of the minimum cut tree game is implied by an undirected graph
G = (V,M) with vertex set V and edge set {j1, . . . , jm}. Given a coalition S ⊆ M ,
GS denotes the subgraph of G containing all vertices but only edges of players in S and
wSe = we for j ∈ S whereas wSe = 0 else. The corresponding characteristic function is
v(S) = min
T : tree inG
∑
e∈S
we · lTe = minT : tree inG
∑
e∈M
wSe · lTe .
Theorem 3.5. The edge player variant is superadditive.
Proof. Let wSe , w
T
e , and w
S∪T
e be deﬁned as above, then w
S∪T
e = w
S
e +w
T
e and at least one
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of the latter summands is equal to 0. We get
v(S ∪ T ) = min
T : tree inG
∑
e∈S∪T
wS∪Te · lTe
= min
T : tree inG
(
∑
e∈S∪T
wSe · lTe +
∑
e∈S∪T
wTe · lTe )
= min
T : tree inG
(
∑
e∈S
wSe · lTe +
∑
e∈T
wTe · lTe )
≥ min
T : tree inG
∑
e∈S
wSe · lTe + minT ′: tree inG
∑
e∈T
wTe · lT
′
e
= v(S) + v(T )
3.3 Core Allocations
Theorem 3.6. Let G be a graph deﬁning the minimum cut tree game v, let T Nr be any
minimum cut tree of G and assign to each vertex i ∈ N the weight of the ﬁrst edge of the
path from i to the root in T Nr , i.e., xi = wGNrtij where (i, j) ∈ P T
Nr
ir . Then x = (xi)i∈N is
a core allocation for v.
Proof. Obviously, the allocation is eﬃcient, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). It remains to show that
the coalitions are satisﬁed, i.e.,
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N . Therefore, we construct the
restricted tree T|Sr according to Construction 3.1. The weight of T|Sr is equal to
∑
i∈S xi
and thus by Lemma 3.2 not smaller than v(S).
The allocation described in the theorem above will be called Gomory-Hu cut allocation
in the following. As the minimum cut tree is not unique in general, the allocation is not
unique either.
Theorem 3.7. For minimum cut tree games it holds:
(i) The core is never empty and a core element can be found in O(n4).
(ii) The core is a singleton if and only if there are no edges with positive weight which
are not adjacent to the root.
(iii) The convex hull of any set of Gomory-Hu cut allocations is a subset of the core.
(iv) They are totally balanced.
(v) They are a proper subset of maximum ﬂow games.
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Proof. (i) Every graph has a corresponding minimum cut tree which yields a core allo-
cation by Theorem 3.6. The complexity results from the complexity of the minimum
cut tree algorithm by Gomory and Hu [GH61].
(ii) If wij = 0 for all i, j = r then v(N) =
∑
i∈N wir. A core allocation satisﬁes
xi ≥ v({i}) = wir and we get
∑
i∈N wir ≤
∑
i∈N xi = x(N) = v(N) =
∑
i∈N wir.
Therefore, xi = wir is the only core allocation.
Let wij > 0 for some i, j = r, let T Nr be a minimum cut tree for Nr and x be the
corresponding Gomory-Hu cut allocation. There are three cases for the position of
i, j and r: j ∈ P T Nrir (or vice versa) or r ∈ P T Nrij or none of the vertices is on a path
between the other two. In the ﬁrst case wij is a component of xi and in the other
cases of xi and xj. Deﬁne x
′ by x′i = xi − wij, x′j = xj + wij and x′k = xk else. We
only have to show that x′(S) ≥ v(S) for i ∈ S and j /∈ S. Following Construction
3.1 the argument of Lemma 3.2 still holds if we do not assign weight wij to vertex
i ∈ S as the cut in GSr would not contain (i, j) anyway. Every convex combination
of x and x′ is an element of the core as well.
(iii) Given any minimum cut tree in Nr, the corresponding Gomory-Hu cut allocation is
in the core by Theorem 3.6. As the core is convex, the result follows.
(iv) The minimum cut tree game is balanced as its core is never empty and every subgame
of a minimum cut tree game is a minimum cut tree game and therefore, it is balanced
itself.
(v) The class of totally balanced games is equivalent to the class of maximum ﬂow
games [KZ82] and there are totally balanced games which cannot be transformed
to a minimum cut tree game, e.g., the superadditive game above.
We introduce a core allocation for the edge player variant which also leads to another core
allocation of the original game.
Theorem 3.8. Let G be a graph deﬁning the edge player variant of the minimum cut tree
game v, let T be any minimum cut tree of G and assign to each edge e ∈ M its weight
multiplied with the number of cuts it is in, i.e., xe = we · lTe . Then x = (xe)e∈M is a core
allocation for v.
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Proof. The allocation is eﬃcient. The payoﬀ to a coalition S is x(S) =
∑
e∈S we · lTe which
is not smaller than the value of a minimum cut tree, v(S) = minT ′: tree inG
∑
e∈S we ·lT
′
e .
Theorem 3.9. Let G be a graph deﬁning the minimum cut tree game v, let T N be any
minimum cut tree of G and assign to each vertex i ∈ N a share of the weights of its incident
edges multiplied with the number of cuts they are in, i.e., xi = wir · lTir +
∑
j =i,r λij ·wij · lTij
with λij + λji = 1 and 0 ≤ λij ≤ 1. Then x = (xi)i∈N is a core allocation for v which is
denoted as Gomory-Hu committee allocation.
Proof. Let w be the edge player variant of the minimum cut tree game and let y be the
allocation in its core as given in Theorem 3.9. Now, let N be the set of vertex players
who play committee games (cf. Curiel et al [CDT89]) on the edges of G. An edge joins
a coalition if and only if its two endvertices join the coalition, this makes the endvertices
so called veto players. If one endvertex of the edge is the root then the other endvertex is
a dictator. Observe that we have the same power structure as in the vertex player game
– for every coalition S ⊆ N its value is the weight of the minimum cut tree in the graph
containing all edges with both endvertices in Sr. The reward ye of an edge in the edge
player variant can be shared in an arbitrary proportion among the corresponding veto
players or dictators.
The Gomory-Hu cut allocation is xi = |N | for all i ∈ N for the unitgame. For the second
game the Gomory-Hu cut allocation is x = (7, 6, 7, 7), whereas Gomory-Hu committee
allocations for λij =
1
2
and λ4i = 1 for all i, j ∈ N are (4, 4, 4, 15) and (7, 6, 6.5, 7.5),
respectively.
In Theorem 3.7 we concluded that every minimum cut tree game is a maximum ﬂow game
and thus, a core allocation can be found in O(n3) once the game is transformed where n is
the number of vertices in the maximum ﬂow game. Kalai and Zemel [KZ82] transformed
a totally balanced game – as the minimum cut tree game – to a maximum ﬂow game as a
minimum game of additive games where each additive game consists of two vertices and n
parallel edges corresponding to the players. The minimum game of these additive games
is their connection in series. In our case this transformation results in a huge number of
vertices.
Theorem 3.10. A supermodular minimum cut tree game of n players can be represented
by the minimum game of at most
(
n
n/2
)
additive games. This bound is sharp.
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Proof. Given a minimum cut tree game with n players, we pick
(
n
n/2
)
marginal vectors and
build additive games with each of them. We have to show that this number is suﬃcient
and necessary to represent the original game. As for supermodular games all marginal
vectors are in the core, they fulﬁll
∑
i∈S mi(v) = m(S) ≥ v(S) for every additive game
and also for the minimum game itself. It remains to show that m(S) = v(S) for at least
one additive game, for supermodular games this is the case for every permutation where
the members of S come ﬁrst. Hence, we need to have every coalition at least once at the
beginning of a permutation. We can build chains of coalitions, i.e., a one-player-coalition
is a subset of a two-player coalition and so on. By the theorem of Dilworth,
(
n
n/2
)
chains
are needed.
The sharpness of the bound can be seen in the unitgame where v(S) = |S|2. For every
player there has to be an edge with weight 1 in at least one additive game. In all other
additive game her edge must not have weight less than 1. To induce the value for a
two-player coalition, the players have to have weight 4 in at least one additive game. This
can never be covered in one additive game for two two-player coalitions, otherwise their
three- or four-player union would have weight less than 9, contradicting the requirement
v(S) = |S|2. Therefore we need at least as many additive games as there are two-player
coalitions. The maximum number of coalitions with the same size is
(
n
n/2
)
for coalitions
with n
2
 players.
3.4 Special Cases
Lemma 3.11. For special cases the weight of a minimum cut tree or an upper bound of
it can be found as follows:
(i) Let G be a graph with cut vertex vc, i.e., the deletion of vc increases the number of
components of G. The graph can be decomposed into components not containing any
cut vertex, observe that the cut vertices of the original graph appear in more than
one component. Then a minimum cut tree can be found by composing the minimum
cut trees of the components.
(ii) Let G be a tree graph, then a minimum cut tree is equal to the graph itself and its
weight is the same as well. This holds for forest graphs as well if edges with weight
0 are added to connect the components.
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(iii) Let G be a cycle graph with m edges, then a minimum cut tree is equal to the
maximum spanning tree and its weight is
∑
e∈G we + (m− 2)mine∈G we.
(iv) Let G = (N ∪ r, E) be a graph with root r and let wij ≤ min{wir, wjr} hold for all
i, j = r, then the minimum cut tree is a star tree with center r and its weight is
∑
i∈N wir + 2
∑
i<j∈N wij
(v) Let G be an unweighted graph with m edges and let δi be the degree of vertex i, the
weight of a minimum cut tree is at most 2 ·m−Δ or equivalently∑i∈V δi−Δ where
Δ is the maximum degree of a vertex in G.
Proof. (i) A minimum cut between two vertices does not contain edges of more than
one component. If it contained edges of at least two components than a proper
subset of these edges would disconnect the two vertices as well and the weight of
this subset would be even smaller. Therefore, minimum cut trees of components are
pairwise independent.
(ii) The tree is the result of the algorithm of Gomory and Hu if in every step the
minimum cut between two vertices adjacent in the original graph is calculated.
This minimum cut consists only of the edge in the original graph.
(iii) In a minimum cut tree there are n − 1 cuts, every cut in a cycle graph contains
at least two edges. Let f = (i, j) be an edge with minimum weight and apply the
algorithm of Gomory and Hu, in every iteration separate two vertices adjacent in
the original graph, do not choose i and j in the same step. A minimum cut between
these vertices contains the edge connecting them and a second edge, preferably an
edge with minimum weight, namely, f . At the end, f contributes to n−1 minimum
cuts and the other edges are contained in one cut.
(iv) Apply the algorithm of Gomory and Hu and choose to separate r and an arbitrary
vertex k. We show that a minimum cut between them is the cut separating k from
all other vertices. Assume the minimum cut separates U ⊆ N from U := Nr \ U ,
with k ∈ U and |U | > 1. The weight of (U,U) is
∑
i∈U, j∈U
wij = wkr +
∑
i∈U\k
wir +
∑
j∈U\r
wkj +
∑
i∈U\k, j∈U\r
wij.
The weight of the cut (k,Nr \ k) is
∑
j∈Nr
wkj = wkr +
∑
i∈U\k
wki +
∑
j∈U\r
wkj
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and is not greater than the weight of (U,U) as wik ≤ wir for all i ∈ N .
(v) Let i be a vertex with maximum degree Δ, now consider the star tree with center i
which is not necessarily a minimum cut tree. Every edge which is non-incident to i
is contained in two cuts, the Δ edges incident to i are contained in one cut and the
edges of the star tree which are not edges of G have weight 0 anyway. Therefore,
the star tree induces total cut weight 2 · (m−Δ) +Δ = 2 ·m−Δ. The remainder
follows as 2 ·m =∑i∈V δi.
Theorem 3.12. Let G be an unweighted graph, let S and T be two coalitions and let
GSr∩Tr be the graph induced by their intersection. We deﬁne s := |Sr|, t := |Tr|, c :=
|V (GSr∩Tr)|, and d := |E(GSr∩Tr)|. The number of isolated vertices in GSr∩Tr is denoted
by h and the number of disjoint paths by k. If the following conditions hold
(i) S and T have at least three members each, neither of them is contained in the other
(ii) GSr and GTr are cycle graphs
(iii) GSr∩Tr consists only of disjoint paths or isolated vertices and d ≥ 1 and d + h ≥ 2
(iv) GSr∩Tr = GSr ∪GTr (i.e. there are no arcs having one vertex in S \ T and the other
in T \ S)
then the graph does not imply a supermodular game.
Proof. Observe that c = h + k + d, there are h vertices with degree 4, 2k vertices with
degree 3 and (s− c) + (t− c) + (d− k) vertices with degree 2 in GSr∪Tr . Note that these
numbers would change if (iv) did not hold. It follows from (ii) and Lemma 3.11 that
v(S) = 2(s − 1), v(T ) = 2(t − 1), and v(S ∩ T ) = d. From the same lemma we get an
upper bound for v(S ∪ T ) and therefore,
v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ) < d + 2 · (s + t− 2c + d− k) + 3 · 2k + 4 · h−Δ
= 2s + 2t + 3d + 4h + 4k − 4c−Δ
= 2s + 2t− d−Δ
where Δ = 3 if h = 0 and Δ = 4 else. On the other hand v(S) + v(T ) = 2s + 2t− 4. As
d +Δ > 4 by condition (iii), we get v(S ∩ T ) + v(S ∪ T ) < v(S) + v(T ).
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There is only one non-isomorphic graph for four players deﬁning a non-supermodular
game, namely, the unweighted version of the graph in Figure 1 and any of its vertices
can be the root. If a graph contains this graph as an induced subgraph it does not imply
a supermodular game. For ﬁve players there are 15 non-isomorphic non-supermodular
graphs.
Theorem 3.13. If G satisﬁes wij ≤ min{wir, wjr} for all i, j = r then the game is
supermodular and the Shapley value corresponds to the Gomory-Hu cut allocation.
Proof. If wir = 0 for a vertex i it follows that wij = 0 for all j ∈ N , i.e., the vertex is
isolated in the original graph. We assume, w.l.o.g., that wir > 0 for all i ∈ N . It follows
from Lemma 3.11 that a minimum cut tree of a coalition S is a star tree with center r.
The game is supermodular, because
v(S) + v(T ) =
∑
i∈S
wir + 2
∑
i<j∈S
wij +
∑
i∈T
wir + 2
∑
i<j∈T
wij
=
∑
i∈S∪T
wir + 2
∑
i<j∈S∪T
wij +
∑
i∈S∩T
wir + 2
∑
i<j∈S∩T
wij
= v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
If a player i enters a coalition S she adds wir + 2
∑
j∈S wij to v(S). In half of the
permutations of N player i enters a coalition already including player j, in this case a
part of her contribution is 2 ·wij which makes wij in average. Player i always adds wir to
the value of a coalition. Therefore the Shapley value of player i is wir +
∑
j∈N wij which
equals the Gomory-Hu cut allocation.
A cactus graph is a graph whose cycles are edge-disjoint. Special cases are tree graphs
and cycle graphs.
Theorem 3.14. For the class of cactus graphs it holds:
(i) Cactus graphs imply supermodular games.
(ii) In tree graphs the Shapley value corresponds to the Gomory-Hu committee allocation
with λij =
1
2
for all i, j ∈ N .
(iii) Let C1, . . . , Ck be the cycles not containing r and Ck+1, . . . , Cl the cycles containing
r. The edge with minimum weight in a cycle Ci is denoted by fi. Then the Shapley
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value is
φ(i) = wir+
1
2
∑
j =r
wij+
∑
Ch:i∈V (Ch),h≤k
|V (Ch)| − 2
|V (Ch)| ·wfh+
∑
Ch:i∈V (Ch),h>k
|V (Ch)| − 2
|V (Ch)| − 1 ·wfh .
Proof. (i) It follows from Lemma 3.11 that the value of a coalition S with cactus graph
GSr is equal to
∑
i∈S wir+
∑
i,j∈S wij+
∑
C: cycle inGSr (n−2)mine∈E(C) we. Observing
that a cycle in the graph of one coalition is in the union of the coalitions and a cycle
in the graph of two coalitions is also in their intersection, the result follows.
(ii) Following from Lemma 3.11, the value of a coalition S is equal to
∑
e∈GSr we or
equivalently
∑
i∈S wir +
∑
i<j∈S wij. If player i enters a coalition already including
player j she adds wir +
∑
j∈S wij to v(S). With the same argument as in Theorem
3.13 the average contribution to the value of a coalition is wir +
1
2
∑
j∈N wij. Hence,
the Shapley value equals the Gomory-Hu committee allocation.
(iii) A player i always contributes wir to the value of a coalition, she adds wij if and only
if player j is already in the coalition, i.e. in half of the cases. Moreover, whenever
player i enters a coalition and therewith closes a cycle C in GSr she adds the weight
of a minimum weight edge in E(C) |V (C)| − 2 times. This happens in 1|V (C)| of the
cases if r is not in C and in 1|V (C)|−1 of the cases else.
Planar graphs do not imply supermodular games in general as can be seen in the graph
of Figure 1.
4 Conclusion
We introduced a cooperative game based on the minimum cut tree problem and showed
how a core solution can be obtained. We started our investigations about the Shapley
value on special graphs. Our future research concerns the Shapley value for general graphs
as well as related cooperative cost games and competitive reward games.
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